From the Foreword Few nations in modern times have been prepared for war. Even the aggressors who have initiated conflicts have not been fully ready, for they could never be certain how their victims would react or what the clash of arms would bring. Nor, since the industrial revolution of the 19th century accelerated the pace of technological change, could a nation predict the impact of new weapons on battle and decide upon new tactics and strategies necessary for victory. For most of its history, the United States, did not trouble itself deeply with problems of preparing for war. With wide oceans separating it from the major powers of the world, and with a tradition isolating it from the balance of power system which governed international relations, this country could afford a military policy predicated on mobilizing after hostilities had begun. Its small peacetime military and naval establishment was designed for border security, for patrol of distance seas and a vast continental interior, for exploration, and after the dawn of the 20th century, for a cadre and training base which would absorb the man power and material of the nation for war time armed forces. . . . The focus of the work is Maj. Gen. Benjamin Foulois and his tenure as chief of the Air Corps. Between 1931 and 1935É Benjamin Foulois made many mistakes not the least of which was his unqualified assurance to President Roosevelt in 1934 that the Air Corps could fly the domestic mails.É Foulois clashed repeatedly with the War Department. He believed passionately in the burgeoning importance of the Army air arm and its need for freedom from Army controlÉ. It is a story as timely today as it was before, when aviation was just emerging as a major force in modern war. . . .

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