From the book First, is the fact of the Soviet offensive buildup. Moscow has been working hard to narrow the missile gap that limited its range of options in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. It has recently doubled the number of its operational ICBM. Also, the larger missile payload the Soviets can mount on their bigger missiles gives them the capability to deploy higher yield nuclear warheads per missile than we can. A second development is the Soviet defense buildup. The Soviet leaders have deployed an ABM system around Moscow, and our best intelligence is that they will expand and improve that system over the years. A third important development is the emergence of Red China as a thermonuclear power, with the advantages this will give China to exploit the weakness of its neighbors unless it has reason to fear the consequences. The main purpose of these hearings is twofold: We want to bring to the Congress and the public the latest information on plans by the executive department concerning the U.S. antiballistic missile program. The decision, announced on September 19, 1967, that our government would undertake the development of a so called thin ABM defense, has significant implications for our national security. We expect the responsible officials, within the bounds of security, to discuss in public and in detail this recently announced program. I believe it is important that as much information as possible should be made available to the American people so that they can better understand the issues involved. It is also our sincere hope that these hearings will help to make clear some of the longer term problems of ballistic missile defense as they relate to maintaining the credibility of the Western deterrent, which is the first essential of our national security and individual liberty, and of the survival of our allies in freedom.

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